The well-known uncovered interest parity puzzle arises from the empirical regularity that, among developed country pairs, the high interest rate country tends to have high expected returns on its short term bonds. At the same time, another strand of the literature has documented that high real interest rate countries tend to have currencies that are strong in real terms -indeed, stronger than can be accounted for by the path of expected real interest differentials under uncovered interest parity. These two strands -one concerning short-run expected changes and the other concerning the level of the real exchange rate -have apparently contradictory implications for the relationship of the foreign exchange risk premium and interest-rate differentials. This paper documents the puzzle, and shows that it poses a challenge for asset pricing models. The features of a model that might reconcile the findings are discussed.
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This study concerns two prominent empirical findings in international finance that have achieved almost folkloric status. The interest parity puzzle in foreign exchange markets finds that over short time horizons (from a week to a quarter) when the interest rate (one country relative to another) is higher than average, the short-term bonds of the high-interest rate currency tend to earn an excess return. That is, the high interest rate country tends to have the higher expected return in the short run. A risk-based explanation of this anomaly requires that the short-term bonds in the high-interest rate country are relatively riskier, and therefore incorporate an excess return as a reward for risk-bearing.
The second stylized fact concerns evidence that when a country's relative real interest rate lies above its average, its currency in levels tends to be stronger than average in real terms. Moreover, the strength of the currency tends to be greater than is warranted by rational expectations of future short-term interest differentials. One way to rationalize this finding is to appeal to the influence of expected future risk premiums on the level of the exchange rate. That is, the country with the relatively high real interest rate has the lower risk premium and hence the stronger currency. When a country's real interest rate is high, its currency is appreciated not only because its bonds pay a higher interest rate but also because they are less risky.
These two predictions about risk go in opposite directions: the high interest rate country has higher expected returns in the short run, but a stronger currency in levels. The former implies the high interest rate currency is riskier, the latter that it is less risky. That is the central puzzle of this paper. This paper produces evidence in a unified framework that confirms these empirical regularities for the exchange rates of the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.K.) relative to the U.S. However, these findings, taken together, constitute a previously unrecognized puzzle regarding how cumulative excess returns or foreign exchange risk premiums affect the level of the real exchange rate. Theoretically, a currency whose assets are perceived to be risky not only currently but looking forward should be weaker, ceteris paribus. In the data, we find that when the U.S. real interest rate is high, its short-term bonds are expected to earn a higher return than foreign bonds, but the dollar is actually stronger in real terms.
It is well-known that macroeconomic models that incorporate the uncovered interest parity assumption imply short-run behavior of changes in exchange rates that is inconsistent with the empirical findings of the interest parity puzzle, but it apparently has gone unrecognized that the set of models that have been built to account for this anomaly are inconsistent with the behavior of the level of the real exchange rate. Many models of foreign exchange risk premiums predict that the high-interest rate currency will be weaker than average in real terms and appreciate over both the short-and long-run. On the other hand, simple models that account for the uncovered interest parity puzzle by positing slow reaction in asset markets do imply that the high-interest rate currency is strong, but have the implication that the exchange rate is excessively stable (rather than excessively volatile) relative to the interest parity benchmark. Neither approach is consistent with the observation that the currency is strong, even relative to the interest-parity milepost, when the country's real interest rates are high.
The literature on the forward premium anomaly is vast. Classic early references include Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984) . Engel (1996) surveys the early work that establishes this puzzle, and discusses the problems faced by the literature that tries to account for the regularity. There have been many recent important contributions, including prominent papers by Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2002) , Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) , Burnside et. al. (2011a Burnside et. al. ( , 2011b Burnside et. al. ( , 2011c , Verdelhan (2010) , Bansal and Shaliastovich (2012) , Backus et. al. (2010) . Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979) are the original papers to draw the link between real interest rates and the level of the real exchange rate in the modern, asset-market approach to exchange rates. The connection has not gone unchallenged, principally because the persistence of real exchange rates and real interest differentials makes it difficult to establish their comovement with a high degree of uncertainty. For example, Meese and Rogoff (1988) and Edison and Pauls (1993) treat both series as non-stationary and conclude that evidence in favor of cointegration is weak. However, more recent work that examines the link between real interest rates and the real exchange rate, such as Engel and West (2006) , Alquist and Chinn (2008) , and Mark (2009) , has tended to reestablish evidence of the empirical link. Another approach connects surprise changes in real interest rates to unexpected changes in the real exchange rate. There appears to be a strong link of the real exchange rate to news that alters the expected real interest differential -see, for example, Faust et. al. (2006) , Andersen et. al. (2007) and Clarida and Waldman (2008) .
However, it is widely recognized that exchange rates are excessively volatile relative to the predictions of monetary models that assume interest parity, or no foreign exchange risk premium. Frankel and Meese (1987) and Rogoff (1996) are prominent papers that make this point. Evans (2011) refers to the "exchange-rate volatility puzzle" as one of six major empirical challenges in the study of exchange rates. Recent contributions include Engel and West (2004) , Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) , and Evans (2012) .
The study of risk premiums in foreign exchange markets sheds light on important questions in asset pricing that go beyond the narrow interest of specialists in international asset markets. The foreign exchange rate is one of the few, if not the only, aggregate asset for an economy whose price is readily measurable, so its pricing offers an opportunity to investigate some key predictions of asset pricing theories. For example, in the absence of arbitrage, the rate of real depreciation of the "Home" country's currency equals the log of the stochastic discount factor (s.d.f.) for Foreign returns relative to the log of the corresponding s.d.f. for Home returns, while the risk premium (as conventionally measured) is proportional to the conditional variance of the log of the s.d.f. for Home relative to the variance of the s.d.f. for Foreign returns.
1 Thus, the behavior of the foreign exchange rate gives direct evidence on the fundamental building blocks of equilibrium asset pricing models.
Section 1 develops the approach of this paper. Section 2 presents empirical results. Section 3 explains why the empirical findings constitute a puzzle. It develops some general conditions that have to be satisfied in order to account for our empirical findings, and then shows that existing theories do not satisfy these conditions. We discuss the difficulties encountered by asset pricing approaches such as representative agent models of the risk premium, and models of "delayed overshooting". 2 We then describe the features of a model that can reconcile the empirical findings. In section 4, we consider various caveats to our findings.
Excess Returns and Real Exchange Rates
We develop here a framework for examining behavior of ex ante excess returns and the level of the real exchange rate. Our set-up will consider a Home and Foreign country. In the empirical work of section 2, we always take the US as the Home country (as does the majority of the literature), and respectively. We will also stipulate that there is no deterministic time trend or drift in the log of real exchange rates, so that the unconditional mean of Similarly, t is the expected infinite sum of excess returns on the Foreign security. We label this the ex ante "level excess return" or "level risk premium", to make reference to its influence on the level of the real exchange rate.
The left-hand side of (4), lim
Eq , can be interpreted as the transitory component of the real exchange rate. In fact, according to our empirical findings reported in section 2, we can treat the real exchange rate as a stationary variable, so lim t t j j E. As is well known, even if the real exchange rate is stationary, it is very persistent. Engel (2000) , in fact, argues that it may be practically impossible to distinguish between the stationary case and the unit root case under plausible economic conditions. We proceed in examining t, assuming stationarity, but note that our methods could be applied to the transitory component of the real exchange rate, taken as the difference between t q and a measure of the permanent component, lim t t j j E q . In section 4, we note how Engel's (2000) interpretation implies that in practice it may not be possible to distinguish a permanent and transitory component, but make the case that the economic analysis of that paper argues for treating the real exchange rate as stationary.
In section 3, we discuss the common assumption in theoretical models of expected returns that markets are complete, implying that log of the real exchange rate change is equal to the difference between the logs of the marginal utilities of a Home consumer and Foreign consumer (plus a constant).
Stationarity of the real exchange rate is completely compatible with a unit root in the log of consumption, or in the marginal utility of consumption. It requires simply that Home and Foreign marginal utilities of consumption be cointegrated, which is a natural condition among well-integrated economies such as the highly developed countries used in this study. It is analogous to the assumption made in almost all
closed-economy models that we can treat the marginal utilities of different consumers within a country as cointegrated.
Under the stationarity assumption, we can write (4) as: 2008, so it would perhaps bias our findings if our sample ended prior to this crash. 7 We treat the real exchange rates as stationary throughout our empirical analysis.
The Appendix details evidence that allows us to reject a unit root in real exchange rates. It is well known that real exchange rates among advanced countries are very persistent. 8 There is no consensus on whether these real exchange rates are stationary or have a unit root. Two recent studies of uncovered interest parity, Mark (2010) and estimate statistical models that assume the real exchange rate is stationary, but do not test for a unit root. Jordà and Taylor (2012) demonstrate that there is a profitable carry-trade strategy that exploits the uncovered interest parity puzzle when the trading rule is enhanced by including a forecast that the real exchange rate will return to its long-run level when its deviations from the mean are large. That paper assumes a stationary real exchange rate and includes 4 We also consider VARs that are augmented with data on stock market returns and long-term interest rates, which are included solely for the purpose of improving the forecasts of future interest rates and inflation rates. 5 This method does not require estimation of long-term real interest rates, about which there is some controversy, but instead estimates the sum of expected future short term nominal interest rates less expected inflation. See . 6 The weights are determined by the value of each country's exports and imports as a fraction of the average value of trade over the six countries. 7 See, for example, and Jordà and Taylor (2012) . 8 See Rogoff (1996) 
Fama regressions
The "Fama regression" (see Fama, 1984) is the basis for the forward premium puzzle. It is usually reported as a regression of the change in the log of the exchange rate between time t+1 and t on the time t interest differential: There is a positive correlation between the excess return on the Foreign currency and the Foreign-Home interest differential. confidence interval for the intercept term, s . (In the case of the U.K., the confidence interval barely excludes zero, while for Japan we find strong evidence that s is greater than zero.)
The G6 exchange rate (the weighted average exchange rate, defined in the data section) appears to be less noisy than the individual exchange rates. In all of our tests, the standard errors of the coefficient estimates are smaller for the G6 exchange rate than for the individual country exchange rates, suggesting that some idiosyncratic movements in country exchange rates get smoothed out when we look at averages. The weights in the G6 exchange rate are constant. We can think of this exchange rate as the dollar price of a fixed basket of currencies, and can interpret our tests as examining the properties of expected returns on this asset. Our discussion focuses on the returns on this asset because its returns appear to be more predictable than for the individual currencies. Examining the behavior of the returns on the weighted portfolio is a more appealing way of aggregating the data and reducing the effects of the idiosyncratic noise in the country data than estimating the Fama regression as a panel using all six exchange rates. There is not a good theoretical reason to believe that the coefficients in the Fama regression are the same across currencies, so the gains from panel methods are likely to be small because the panel would impose no restrictions across the equations on the coefficients. The findings regression (9) in real terms are similar to those when the regression is estimated on nominal variables. For all currencies, the estimates of q , reported in Table 2 , are positive, which implies that the high real interest rate currency tends to have high real expected excess returns. The estimated coefficient for the G6 aggregate is close to 2. This summary is true for both VAR models. Table 2 and all of the subsequent tables report three sets of confidence intervals for each parameter estimate. The first is based on Newey-West standard errors, ignoring the fact that ˆd t r is a generated regressor. The second two are based on bootstraps. The first bootstrap uses percentile intervals and the second percentile-t intervals.
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From Table 2 , all three sets of confidence intervals are similar. For the individual currencies, for both Model 1 and Model 2, the confidence interval for q lies above zero for Germany, Japan, and the U.K. It contains zero for Canada and Italy, and contains zero for France except using the second confidence interval. The point estimates from the Fama regressions in nominal returns (reported in Table   1 ) and in real terms (Table 2) are quite similar, but the confidence intervals for the bilateral exchange rates are wider, leading to fewer rejections of the uncovered interest parity null. 9 The intercept coefficient, on the other hand is very near zero, and the 90% confidence interval easily contains zero. 10 See Hansen (2010) . The Appendix describes the bootstraps in more detail.
The findings are clear using the G6 average exchange rate: the coefficient estimate is 1.93 when the real interest estimate comes from Model 1, and 1.91 when Model 2 is used. All of the confidence intervals lie above zero. For both models, the estimate of q is very close to zero, and the confidence intervals contain zero.
In summary, the evidence on the interest parity puzzle is similar in real terms as in nominal terms.
The point estimates of the coefficient q are positive and tend to be statistically significantly greater than zero, which implies cov( , ) 0
. Even in real terms, the country with the higher interest rate tends to have short-run excess returns (i.e., excess returns and the interest rate differential are positively correlated.) Table 3 reports estimates from
The real exchange rate, real interest rates, and the level risk premium
In all cases (all currencies, for both Model 1 and Model 2), the coefficient estimate is negative. In almost all cases, although the confidence intervals are wide, the coefficient is significantly negative.
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Recall from equation (7) If interest parity held, the behavior of the real exchange rate should conform to the plot for
That line indicates that the U.S. dollar tends to be strong in real terms when ˆd t r is high, and then is expected to depreciate back toward its long-run mean. The line for the regression of t j q on ˆd t r shows three things: First, when ˆd t r is above average, the dollar tends to be strong in real terms, and much stronger than would be implied under uncovered interest parity. Second, when ˆd t r is above average, the dollar is expected to appreciate even more in the short run. This is the uncovered interest parity puzzle.
Third, when ˆd t r is above average, the dollar is expected to reach its maximum appreciation after around 5 months, then to depreciate gradually.
14 One implication of these dynamics is similar to Jordà and Taylor's (2012) findings about forecasting nominal exchange rate changes. They find that the nominal interest differential can help to predict exchange rate changes in the short run: the high interest rate currency is expected to appreciate (contrary to the predictions of uncovered interest parity.) But the forecasts of the exchange rate can be enhanced by taking into account purchasing power parity considerations. The deviation from PPP helps predict movements of the nominal exchange rate as the real exchange rate adjusts toward its long-run level.
We consider two extensions of the empirical analysis to see if augmenting the simple VARs estimated here can sharpen the forecasts of future short-term real interest rates. The results reported so far are from VARs with three lags, using monthly data. We estimated the model using 12 lags for all VARs. 13 The plots for most of the other real exchange rates look qualitatively very similar. 14 The line labeled "Model" is discussed in the next section. Tables 2, 3 , and 4.
The point estimates from the augmented models were quite similar to those from the more parsimonious models, but the confidence intervals were wider. In short, the augmented models do not seem to add any useful information. Figure 3 reproduces the plot of the slope coefficient estimates that correspond to Figure 2 . The top panel is for the 12-lag VAR, and the bottom for the VAR augmented with stock-price and government bond yield data.
We turn now to the implications of these empirical findings for models of the foreign exchange risk premium.
The Puzzle

The General Problem
Macroeconomic models that are built to explain the uncovered interest parity often incorporate only a single macroeconomic variable that drives both interest rates and ex ante excess returns. r implied by the models that assume perfect correlation between the interest differential and the risk premium, which are discussed below in section 3.2. The models are built to account for the empirical finding that the Home currency tends to appreciate in the short run when the home interest rate is high, but the models leave the correlation of the level of the real exchange rate and the real interest differential with the wrong sign.
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The second type of model is the one that assumes the impulse response functions of 22 In fact, the conditions in the appendix are necessary and sufficient for a multi-factor model. There must be a grouping of factors into two groups, which satisfy the conditions. 23 In other words, * 1t z maps into 3t z in equations (18) Bekaert et. al. (1997) and Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) are earlier approaches that also use Epstein-Zin preferences.
open economy. 27 The single factor that drives expected returns and the risk premium is the difference between the variances of the long-term growth rates of consumption in the Home and Foreign economies.
It is difficult to conceive of a natural generalization of the symmetric model with CampbellCochrane preferences to two factors, since that would imply there are two habit levels that matter for utility. The symmetric long-run risk model, on the other hand, could be generalized because there might be different components to consumption growth, whose variance could affect both expected returns and the risk premium. However, the restrictions on preferences that can deliver the result that cov( , ) 0 d t t r will also imply cov( , ) 0
. Following Lustig, et. al. (2011) , the economic intuition of these restrictions comes from the fact that in order to explain the interest parity puzzle, there must be factors that drive both The models we have considered so far are symmetric -households in both countries have identical utility functions for aggregate consumption, and the parameters in the exogenous stochastic processes for endowments are the same in the two countries. Now consider the possibility of a common component to risk, for which the two countries respond asymmetrically. To simplify matters, assume a single factor, t z , and ask whether it can account for cov( , ) 0
. In the context of equations (21) and (22), allow a single factor but different parameters: 
Not delayed overshooting/ delayed reaction
The behavior of exchange rates and interest rates described here seems related to the notion of "delayed overshooting". The term was coined by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) , but is used to describe a hypothesis first put forward by Froot and Thaler (1990) . Froot and Thaler's explanation of the forward premium anomaly was that when, for example, the Home interest rate rises, the currency appreciates as it would in a model of interest parity such as Dornbusch's (1976) classic paper. They hypothesize that the full reaction of the market is delayed, perhaps because some investors are slow to react to changes in interest rates, so that the currency keeps on appreciating in the months immediately following the interest rate increase. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2010) build a model based on this intuition. Much of the empirical literature that has documented the phenomenon of delayed overshooting has focused on the impulse response of exchange rates to identified monetary policy shocks, though in the original context, the story was meant to apply to any shock that leads to an increase in relative interest rates. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) , Kim and Roubini (2000) , Faust and Rogers (2003) , Scholl and Uhlig (2008), and Bjornland (2009 We reproduce (13) for convenience:
.
From these relations, we can derive:
The coefficients i b in the moving-average representation for t q in equation (28) Froot and Thaler (1990) present a descriptive model of delayed overshooting that, they say, can explain the interest parity puzzle:
Consider as an example, the hypothesis that at least some investors are slow in responding to changes in the interest differential. It may be that these investors need some time to think about trades before executing them, or that they simply cannot respond quickly to recent information. These investors might also be called "central banks," who seem to "lean against the wind" by trading in such a way as to attenuate the appreciation of a currency as interest rates increase. Other investors in the model are fully rational, albeit risk averse, and even may try to exploit the first group's slower movements. A simple story along these lines has the potential for reconciling the above facts. First, it yields negative coefficient estimates of -3 as long as some changes in nominal interest differentials also reflect changes in real interest differentials. While changes in nominal interest rates have different instantaneous effects on the exchange rate across different exchange-rate models, most of these models predict that an increase in the dollar real interest rate (all else equal) should lead to instantaneous dollar appreciation. If only part of this appreciation occurs immediately, and the rest takes some time, then we might expect the exchange rate to appreciate in the period subsequent to an increase in the interest differential. (p. 188)
In this story of delayed reactions in markets, Froot and Then the moving-average coefficients in equation (27) so it will not account for the empirical puzzles found here.
Liquidity return
As was noted in section 3.1, a model that can successfully account for the empirical findings of this paper may need to incorporate two sources of economic shocks that have different implications for the impact on interest rates and excess returns. A model that might have such properties is one in which short-term assets are valued not only for their return but also for some role they play as liquid assets. We use "liquidity" in the same sense as , to refer to the usefulness of an asset to meet capital and margin requirements so that lenders can obtain funding. For example, short-term interest bearing assets might be used as collateral for loans. However, U.S. and foreign short-term assets might not be perfect substitutes as collateral. For institutional reasons, perhaps, some lenders prefer one The stability condition in the dynamic system is the familiar Taylor condition, 1 . Equation (33) assumes in each country, the policymaker targets its own consumer price inflation, and that the instrument rules are identical. t are deviations of monetary policy from strict inflation targeting. We assume that these deviations are persistent, to match the extensive empirical evidence on the persistence of short-term policy rates: t represents the shock to the liquidity return of Foreign relative to Home assets. It is assumed to be mean-zero, i.i.d., though the relevant assumption is that it is not as persistent as t . A positive realization of t reduces the expected return on the Foreign short-term asset relative to the expected return on the Home asset. This represents an increase in the liquidity value of the Foreign asset (relative to the Home.)
That is, the true return to the holder of the Foreign asset includes the monetary return plus the shadow value of the liquidity or collateral value.
We also assume that t increases as the Home less Foreign real interest differential increases.
When Home monetary policy tightens ( t rises), the Home central bank drains short-term Home-currency denominated liquidity. As a result, the liquidity value of the Home short-term assets remaining in the hands of the public increases. This reduces the required ex ante return on Home assets relative to Foreign assets, implying an increase in t . 
Other Issues
Whose price index?
The empirical approach taken in section 2 requires taking a stand on the appropriate price index used to deflate nominal returns for the Home and Foreign investor. In each country, we deflated nominal returns using the consumer price index measure of inflation. The theory of the risk premium discussed in section 3.3, however, applies to a representative agent, but the theory does not give us any guide as to which real world price index best represents the model's representative agent.
However, Engel (1993 Engel ( ,1999 We have rejected a unit root in the real exchange rate, and so conclude that there is only a t component. However, if the t component has such a small innovation variance that it is undetectable, it is nearly observationally equivalent to the model with a stationary real exchange rate, and we cannot improve on the approach of measuring the transitory component, t , by the actual real exchange rate.
The term structure
There are two possible ways to see connections between this study and studies of the term structure. First, is there a relationship between the findings here, and those of Alexius (2001) Another connection is that there is an analogy to the uncovered interest parity puzzle in the term structure literature. The long-short yield differential can predict excess returns. However, the literature on the term structure does not have evidence such as that in Figure 1 - On the other hand, models of t based on risk averse behavior also run into difficulties. Our empirical findings imply that somehow the country that has the high real interest rate today must have short term assets that are riskier in the short run but less risky in the long run. Models that are built to account for the uncovered interest parity puzzle impose restrictions on preferences that give cov( , ) 0
, but these models then imply cov( , ) 0
We suggest a possible avenue to explain our findings by introducing a non-pecuniary liquidity return on assets. When a country's assets become more valued for their liquidity, the country's currency appreciates. This eases inflationary pressure, allowing policymakers to lower interest rates. On the other hand, when monetary policy is deliberately made tighter, the short-term assets remaining in the hands of the public are more valued for their liquidity. So the non-pecuniary liquidity return can be negatively There may be other possible resolutions to the empirical puzzles presented here. Several recent papers have explored the implications for rare, large currency depreciations for the uncovered interest parity puzzle. Farhi and Gabaix (2011) present a full general equilibrium model of rare disasters and real exchange rates. Their model implies that when the Home real interest rate is high, the Home currency is weak in real terms, and so cannot account for the levels puzzle presented here. 35 This correlation occurs during "normal times" in their model -the anticipation of a future disaster leads to a simple positive correlation between the real interest differential and the real exchange rate. Nonetheless, there are two caveats that must be considered in light of Farhi and Gabaix and the related literature. The first is that if rare disasters are important, than the linear VAR technology used in this paper may not correctly capture the stochastic process for real exchange rates and real interest rates. Farhi et. al. (2009 ) and Burnside et. al. (2011a , 2011b extract information from options to infer expectations about rare large movements in 35 See also Guo (2009 ), Gourio et. al. (2012 and Gourinchas et. al. (2010) . exchange rates. Moreover, if these large rare events are important, then the lognormal approximations that lie behind our analysis of the risk premium in sections 3.3 and 3.4 are not correct. Higher order cumulants matter for the risk premium in that case.
36
It may be that it is necessary to abandon the assumption that all agents have fully rational expectations. Some version of the model proposed by Hong and Stein (1999) may account for the empirical results uncovered here, which perhaps could be described as a combination of overreaction and momentum trading. That is, the short-term behavior of the real exchange rate under high interest rates incorporates overreaction in that the currency appreciates more than it would under interest parity. But perhaps momentum trading leads to expectations of further appreciation in the short run when the interest rate is high. Burnside et. al. (2011c) , and Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) , are recent approaches that have relaxed the assumption of full rationality in some way. Ilut (2012) adopts an optimizing approach in which ambiguity averse agents who are averse to uncertainty may underreact to good news and overreact to bad news.
High real interest rates tend to strengthen a currency. That is common wisdom in foreign exchange markets. It fits the textbook description of exchange rate behavior, and is consistent with the empirical evidence in this paper and in other recent studies. This regularity cannot be ignored when we try to explain the uncovered interest parity puzzle. The high interest rate country may have short run expected excess returns (the uncovered interest parity puzzle), but it has a strong currency as well. (43)) and the inflation rate. For each country, the real exchange rate and inflation rates depend only on own-country lags under the null. The bootstrap proceeds as in the model with no covariates.
The bottom panel of Table A1 reports the estimated and its distribution for the model with covariates in the row labeled "with covariates". Adding covariates does not alter the conclusion that we can reject a unit root at the 5 percent level.
Based on these tests, we will proceed to treat the real exchange rate as stationary, though we note that the evidence favoring stationarity is thin for the Canadian dollar and Japanese yen real exchange rates. Tables 2, 3 , and 4, we construct pseudo-samples using the VAR estimates. 38 For each pseudo-sample, we estimate the VAR. We estimate all of the regression coefficients reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4, and calculate the Newey-West standard errors for each of those regressions. We repeat this exercise 1000 times.
The first confidence interval based on the bootstraps (the second confidence interval reported for each coefficient estimate) uses the coefficient estimates reported in the tables. Let ˆ refer to any of the coefficient estimates reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4. From the regressions on the pseudo-samples, we order the coefficient estimates from these 1000 replications from smallest to largest -1 is the smallest and 1000 be the largest. The confidence interval reported in the tables is based on (
. That is, the reported
